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Introduction
Modern archaeology is a science that, with 
its methods and theories, keeps constantly 
vacillating between natural sciences and 
humanities. Archaeology, it can be argued, 
still has not found its niche in the sciences. 
Archaeology has been seeking for its sci-
entific justification from the natural sci-
ences, especially geology and physics, and 
from the humanities, anthropology, litera-
ture studies, linguistics, and sociology for 
example. The topic has been dealt with ex-
tensively in archaeology but the problem 
persists, especially when examining the 
relationship between scientific archaeol-
ogy and alternative ways of experiencing 
the past.
In this article, I will, on the one hand, 
draw a brief history of archaeology and 
discuss the ways archaeology has been 
striving to become scientific. I will be con-
centrating on an era when archaeology 
has already been established as a modern 
science, not just a bunch of methods bor-
rowed from other fields of science. My 
goal on the one hand is to evaluate the re-
lationship between archaeology and other 
sciences as whole disciplines (namely se-
miotics and natural sciences in general), 
not so much the dialogue between partic-
ular scholars, although I will also refer to 
such cases. I will discuss the history of ar-
chaeology by concentrating mainly on its 
aspirations of becoming a science during 
the last 30 years or so. The brief history 
I provide is by no means a complete one. 
It is not my intention to provide a com-
plete history of archaeology as there are 
many textbooks where one can be found 
(see, e.g., Daniel 1975; Johnson 1999; 
Trigger 2006; Lucas 2012). My intention is 
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to provide a background with which the 
ideas of a new scientific archaeology pro-
vided toward the end of the article can be 
contrasted.
That having been said, I will also be 
concentrating on (1) identifying the rea-
sons archaeology suffered a loss of cred-
ibility as a science, (2) how and why phi-
losophy of science became an important 
question again during the last ten years or 
so as a result of the so-called speculative 
turn in continental philosophy (Bryant et 
al. 2011) and the revived interest in prag-
matist semiotics, and (3) what the future 
of scientific archaeology might look like 
and what are some of the key tenets of a 
scientific attitude in archaeology. In this 
respect I will be referring to the pragmati-
cist philosophy of science as formulated 
by the American semiotician and philoso-
pher Charles Peirce (1839–1914) during 
the end of the 19th century and the begin-
ning of the 20th century.
Archaeology as a modern 
phenomenon and a 
natural science
Scientific archaeology is a modern phe-
nomenon that can be seen to have born in 
a modern social and philosophical atmos-
phere (Thomas 2004a; 2004b, 17; Lucas 
2004, 109; Holtorf 2010, 10). Modernism, 
on the other hand, is characterised by an 
increase in land use caused by industri-
alisation, which in turn caused an increase 
in archaeological finds; the wealthy land 
owning segment of the population started 
to collect antiquities and archaeology be-
came a typologising science (Crawford 
1932 in Daniel 1975, 53).
Archaeology as a science can be seen 
to have gotten its inspiration on the one 
hand from natural sciences starting as 
early as the latter part of the 19th century 
when the history of mankind was, using 
the methodology borrowed from geology, 
proven to be much longer than that de-
picted in the Bible (e.g. Renfrew & Bahn 
2004, 26; Gamble & Kruszynski 2009). 
In addition to this, modern archaeology 
can be seen to have born as a result of 
C. J. Thomsen’s three-period system and 
Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theory. The 
three-period system and typology in par-
ticular can be seen to reside at the heart of 
scientific archaeology, assuming a science 
will always need its own scientific method. 
Typology and the three-period system be-
came the scientific method of a scientific 
archaeology (Rodden 1981, 51). 
The new scientific archaeology differed 
from antiquarianism, ‘pre-archaeology’ as 
mere collecting of antiquities, in that its 
objective was to make inferences about 
the past by studying the artefacts. Whereas 
antiquarians treated the objects simply as 
collectibles, archaeology believed in the 
ability of the material to give information 
about the past – it just needed to be stud-
ied systematically (Schnapp 2008, 396; 
Thomas 2004a, 3, 157). Leo Klejn (1973, 
695–696, 700) has noted that the mod-
ern condition of archaeology is particu-
larly manifested in systems thinking and 
the ability of natural sciences to give all-
encompassing explanations. According 
to Klejn, traits of systems thinking could 
already be seen in early cultural history, 
where style, type, and archaeological cul-
ture can be seen as early modes of systems. 
Systems thinking then later became popu-
lar in processual archaeology.
The systematic approach is one of the 
very modern traits of archaeology. Sys-
tematic thinking is also an integral part 
of modern philosophy which in turn has 
affected archaeological thinking greatly. 
The father of modern philosophy, René 
Descartes, aimed to create a method of 
systematic skepticism, in which all senso-
ry data is to be doubted. The only certain-
ty to be found was in the thinking subject. 
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Isaac Newton, on the other hand, was 
working on his mechanistic view of the 
world that would be based on a systematic 
view of the functions of the cosmos. In ad-
dition to this, another important trait of 
modernist philosophy is the tendency to 
postulate a final state of affairs (Thomas 
2004a, 3) – how things are and how they 
could ultimately be (for utopias and dysto-
pias in archaeology, see also Shanks et al. 
2004, 75–76). Modernism is therefore also 
characterised by the clear rationalist idea 
of the separation between theory and data 
– a recurring theme also in archaeology.
It is therefore no coincidence that the 
ideal of scientific archaeology has al-
ways based on the natural sciences and 
positivism. When the archaeology that 
was inspired by geology and biology was 
strengthened by the discovery of radiocar-
bon dating, archaeologists turned to the 
natural sciences and physics in particular 
for new possibilities of objectifying the 
past as a neutral object of study. Natural 
science became a way of avoiding the kind 
of unreasonable acts that were made in the 
name of an archaeology that was inspired 
by nationalistic, political, and propagan-
dist agendas.
The era of questioning 
archaeology as a science
Starting at the beginning of the 1960s, 
German archaeologists were no longer 
able to keep up with the theoretical and 
methodological discussion that emerged 
in the United States. The so-called ‘New 
Archaeology’, born in the USA, had 
reached Europe via Great Britain (Härke 
1991, 191). In this historical context, one 
interesting question deals with the rela-
tionship between Finnish and German 
archaeology. The Finnish school system 
was, excluding the most recent 50 years, 
inspired by the German school system. 
The Holocaust was also in this sense a 
great separator that led to the spreading 
of American culture, including American 
science, to Europe. The Holocaust is often 
said to have ended the modern period and 
started the postmodern era (Eaglestone 
2001, 7 in Thomas 2004a, 50), which is 
in turn characterised by the disappear-
ance of the borders between science and 
popular culture and art, and scientists and 
laymen.
The postmodern condition manifests 
for example in the topics of books about 
the history and theory of archaeology. 
Before postmodernism, archaeology can 
be said to have one history (the history 
of archaeology), whereas during the new 
multivocal period, scholars wanted to 
stress the many approaches to history 
and the past and the subjective nature 
of knowledge and experience. ‘The’ his-
tory of archaeology became ‘a’ history of 
archaeology or ‘histories’ of archaeology. 
One of the goals was probably also to di-
minish the expert cult that was seen to 
hinder communication between science 
and popular culture. This is when popu-
lar archaeology emerged and the ability 
of archaeology to gain knowledge about 
one real past was questioned. Everyone 
became an archaeologist.
One practical example of an attempt to 
lose the gap between scientific archaeol-
ogy and alternative approaches to the past 
is the recent change that the American 
Anthropological Society (AAA) made to 
their long term plan. The word ‘science’ 
was dropped from the agenda. Their ob-
jective earlier was “to advance anthropol-
ogy as the science that studies humankind 
in all its aspects.” Now their goal is to “ad-
vance public understanding of human-
kind in all its aspects.” (see Normark 2010 
for a take on the subject).
The binary thinking characteristic of 
modern thinking is obvious here. The 
change is also characteristic of relativist 
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and multivocal postmodernism. There 
is an epistemological problem between 
scientific and interpretative archaeology. 
There has been a hermeneutic shift in ar-
chaeology from science as an apparatus of 
providing explanations about the past, to 
science as a means of understanding the 
past individual. The time of this shift to 
contextual archaeology can be pinpointed 
to the 1980s. Ian Hodder’s (1987) article 
The contextual analysis of symbolic mean-
ings started the so-called contextual ar-
chaeology. The objective of archaeology 
went from explaining past processes as 
part of a natural system to understand-
ing past people as individuals with unique 
motivations and intentions. Archaeology 
became hermeneutic and the individual 
was now seen as an agent and an author 
of text. By the same token material cul-
ture was now treated as text (more on this 
below).
The post-processual archaeology that 
emerged in the 1980s is a very postmodern 
phenomenon. It is characterised by a frag-
mentary field of science and the plentitude 
of theories and methods. Post-processual 
archaeology has been called relativistic 
‘anything goes’ archaeology (Oestigaard 
2004, 35) that is plagued by atheoretical 
thinking. Robert Dunnell (1992, 85–86) 
has identified two reasons for archaeol-
ogy’s failure to become scientific. The 
first reason was the adoption of physics as 
the leading ideal of science in processual 
archaeology. The other reason was a cer-
tain commonsensism that, according to 
Dunnell, was also introduced to archae-
ology by processualism. Archaeology has 
undergone 150 years of ‘scientification’, 
but not once have the term ‘science’ and 
the conditions of science been adequately 
described (Dunnell 1992, 75). According 
to Dunnell (1992, 86), the use of common 
sense does not advance science. He main-
tains that archaeology needs a theory of its 
own, something that has not been found 
yet. Dunnell really believes it is possible to 
find one such theory. I must disagree. But 
Dunnell is correct in stating that a scien-
tific archaeology would be based on falsi-
ficationism (the idea that knowledge must 
be based on small hypotheses that are easy 
to falsify when they are found to be incor-
rect). Dunnell identifies common sense as 
being based on big hypotheses such as the 
idea of cultural evolution. When the idea 
about cultural evolution is falsified, it will 
break down the entire system of archaeo-
logical knowledge that is fundamentally 
based on the false rationalist idea of cul-
tural evolution as somehow separate from 
natural evolution.
Physics, according to Dunnell (1992, 
88) is also not pertinent as a leading idea 
of science of archaeology since archaeol-
ogy is history, not natural science. This 
view is backed up by Glyn Daniel (1975, 
310–311) when he writes that archaeology 
and anthropology cannot be called a natu-
ral science more than natural sciences can 
be called history. Even though archaeol-
ogy has its roots in geology, archaeology 
is a humanist science the object of which 
is mankind and culture, not nature. Daniel 
thereby falls victim of the same kind of 
false demarcation between culture and 
nature as Dunnell. Because of its human-
ist nature, archaeology was fitted with a 
variety of approaches from the humanities 
during and after the 1980s. Particularly in-
fluential were literary studies and semiot-
ics (more on this below).
According to Bruce Trigger (2008, 365), 
Glyn Daniel’s historiography of archaeol-
ogy favoured cultural history as an ap-
proach instead of being a cultural evolu-
tionist. Trigger writes that, according to 
Daniel, without cultural history archaeol-
ogy would have become object-oriented 
antiquarianism. It is therefore ironic that 
some scholars, such as Johan Normark 
(e.g. 2010), are taking archaeology to a 
more object-oriented direction. Their 
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goal is to pick up archaeology where the 
so-called symmetrical discourse left it 
and even more aggressively debunk some 
of the binaries that have been plaguing 
archaeological theory. These include for 
example such pairs as natural/cultural 
and material/immaterial or tangible/in-
tangible (a notion used extensively in cul-
tural heritage theory). Normark calls his 
approach posthumanocentric and neo-
materialist archaeology and draws his in-
spiration from the philosophies of Gilles 
Deleuze and Manuel DeLanda. He sees 
no objection for combining humanities 
and natural sciences. Actually he does not 
want to make such distinctions in the first 
place. It is true that the historiography of 
archaeology has sometimes fallen victim 
of using too great distinctions. Labeling 
the use of natural scientific methods as 
impertinent will not help in making ar-
chaeology a science. Normark’s approach 
is therefore a good example of an aspira-
tion to make archaeology a science again. 
This approach in turn is based on realis-
ing that knowledge about the past should 
and must be made using various methods 
liberally. Let us not make the mistake of 
dividing science into cultures as identi-
fied by Charles Percy Snow (1998, vii–
viii) who wrote already in the 1960s about 
the sciences having been divided into two 
cultures, ‘the literary intellectuals’ and the 
natural scientists. There exist two cultures 
also in archaeology. There are on the one 
hand those who believe in the natural 
sciences as the true scientific method, 
and on the other hand those who see ar-
chaeology as humanism; or processualists 
and post-processualists in paradigmatic 
terms. Both cultures share what Snow 
(1998, viii) called “a profound mutual 
suspicion and incomprehension”. This 
is where archaeology is now. There has, 
however, been much discussion of what is 
going to be the next scientific ‘paradigm’ 
of archaeology.
The possibility of a new 
scientific archaeology – 
archaeology after text
It is not necessary to categorically distin-
guish between the scientific methods of 
the natural sciences and the non-scientific 
methods borrowed from humanities, but 
it is necessary to explicitly announce that 
archaeology, like any science, has an ob-
ject of study. Without an object, no science 
would be possible. The object of study in 
archaeology is material culture, i.e. mate-
rial objects created or left behind by man 
as a sign of his action during the various 
time periods, but also natural ‘artefacts’ 
that were present during that time.
During the last decade or so, there has 
been a revived interest in anthropology 
toward material culture. Robert Preucel 
(2006, 14) has noted that this trend is one 
of the most interesting advances in recent 
anthropology1. Even though archaeology 
has always been characterised as the study 
of material culture, there is a change to be 
identified that holds in it a shift in the phil-
osophical outlook and different type of 
ontological and epistemological questions.
Even though the many meanings of ma-
terial culture have been at the heart of ar-
chaeological study for the last thirty years, 
during the most recent ten years scholars 
have started to approach them from an-
other ontological viewpoint – one that is 
not based on a clear distinction between 
the cultural human and the material world 
surrounding him. Several causes underlie 
this change. One of the most influential 
philosophical traditions to ever affect ar-
chaeology, namely continental philoso-
phy and phenomenology, experienced 
what has been called the speculative turn 
(Bryant et al. 2011). The speculative turn, 
1  Preucel’s background is in American anthro-
pological archaeology. That is one reason he 
refers to anthropology.
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as a counter term for the linguistic turn, 
refers to a change in continental philoso-
phy that includes the emergence of neo-
realism and neomaterialism. There has 
been a revived interest in questions of ma-
teriality in continental philosophy, which 
during the 20th century was more or less 
saturated with the ideas of existentialism 
and the idea of man as an authentic in-
dividual. Neomaterialists do not want to 
make a clear distinction between mind 
and matter. The linguistic turn meant 
taking language as a starting point for 
all perception and therefore knowledge. 
Neomaterialists do not want to make such 
a priori assumptions about the fundamen-
tal role of language as a structure. This 
means that the past and its material cul-
ture has now been more or less objectified 
as something real and independent of the 
individual mind. This change in turn has 
led to a revived importance of ontological 
and epistemological questions in the study 
of material culture. Such archaeologists 
as Johan Normark (see his Archaeological 
Haecceities blog), Bjørnar Olsen (2010; 
2012), Matt Edgeworth (2012), and 
Christopher Witmore (2012) have been 
influenced by speculative realism and ob-
ject-oriented philosophy in particular.
Witmore’s conception of objects is 
mostly based on the writings of such phi-
losophers as Graham Harman and Levi 
Bryant. The core tenet of object-oriented 
philosophy is that what ultimately exists 
is objects. Objects can be said to share 
various relationships with each other. Levi 
Bryant (2011, 26) for example does not 
follow the modernist schema of relation-
ism in which objects are thought to be de-
fined by their relations with each other. He 
follows Graham Harman’s object-oriented 
philosophy and maintains that objects are 
always withdrawn from relations (Bryant 
2011, 26), i.e. “that objects have no direct 
access to one another and that each ob-
ject translates other objects with which it 
enters into non-relational relations”. Nor 
are all objects thought to be in relation (or 
non-relational relation) with each other 
(Bryant 2011, 68). Not everything that 
happens affects all objects. In this sense 
Bryant (2011, 68) makes a distinction 
between objects and their relations and 
maintains that the universe is not a closed 
system where everything affects every-
thing. In fact, he points out that if this were 
the case, if objects were only constituted 
by their relations with each other, every-
thing would be frozen, and nothing would 
move (Bryant 2011, 68). Bryant (2011, 69) 
then goes on to explicate his philosophy 
of objects by stating that “we must not say 
that an object has its qualities or that qual-
ities inhere in an object, nor above all that 
objects are their qualities, but [...] we must 
say that qualities are something an object 
does”. This is an essentially pragmatistic 
view of objects and one of the many points 
of connection that speculative realism has 
with classical American pragmatism. The 
pragmatic maxim tells us to “[c]onsider 
what effects, that might conceivably have 
practical bearings, we conceive the object 
of our conception to have. Then, our con-
ception of these effects is the whole of our 
conception of the object” (CP 5.402)2.
2  Abbreviations used in this article refer to the 
following edited volumes of Peirce’s writings as 
follows:
CP 1–8 followed by the number of paragraph: 
Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 8 
volumes, volumes 1–6 eds C. Hartshorne and 
P. Weiss; volumes 7–8 ed. A. W. Burks. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge 1931–1958.
EP 1 followed by page number: Houser & Klo-
esel 1992.
EP 2 followed by page number: Peirce Edition 
Project 1998.
NEM 1–4 followed by page number: The New 
Elements of Mathematics 1–4. Four volumes in 
five books. Ed. C. Eisele 1976. Hague: Mouton 
Publishers.
SS followed by page number: Semiotic and Sig-
nifics: The Correspondence Between Charles S. 
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In addition to being shared by both spec-
ulative realists and pragmatists, the idea of 
an object being defined by its potential 
effects can also be seen in the writings 
of some current archaeologists. Bjørnar 
Olsen (2012, 212), for example, writes that 
a thing cannot be substituted by any other 
thing since things have their unique com-
petence or affordances. Olsen seems to be 
supporting the view that the meaning of 
an object is in the possible effects it is ca-
pable of producing. This is an essentially 
realist definition for a thing: things, as far 
as they are active by their virtue of being 
able to act, are general. In order for us to 
study the possible meanings of things in 
the past, a certain degree of generality is 
needed. Particular things of the past be-
come general by their similar affordances, 
or the habits of acting they involve, to use 
a more pragmatistic vocabulary. Certain 
slow-changing and all-encompassing hab-
its, like the laws of physics, provide a com-
mon ground also for the study of the past 
(Marila 2014).
In addition to the object-oriented at-
titude, another reason archaeology may 
have a chance to become scientific again 
is the adoption of another kind of semiot-
ics as a method of study of material cul-
ture meanings. During the last 40 years 
or so, archaeological semiotics has usu-
ally meant studying the archaeological 
record from a semiological starting point 
that is based on the structural semiotics 
of Ferdinand de Saussure. His semiotics, 
or semiology, holds in it the idea of lan-
guage as a structure according to which all 
knowledge is structured. That is why the 
treatment of material culture as text was 
very popular during the 1980s and the 
1990s. When post-processual archaeology 
hit a dead end, all semiotic approaches 
Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby. Ed. C. S. Hard-
wick & J. Cook 1977. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press.
were labelled anthropocentric and im-
pertinent to the study of material culture. 
Preucel and Bauer (2001, 87) point out 
that it is not semiotics where the problem 
lies but the use of Saussurean semiology. 
Saussure’s semiology was very systematic 
(its main goal was to create a systematic 
method for linguistic studies) and that is 
one reason it was also found fruitful for a 
systematic scientific archaeology.
There is, however, no reason to aban-
don all semiotic methods as limited. 
Preucel and Bauer (2001, 87) suggest that 
a semiotics based on the philosophy of 
Charles Peirce should be taken as a sub-
stitute. Peirce’s semiotics is not based on a 
dyadic relationship between the signified 
(object) and the signifier (sign), but on a 
triadic understanding of the sign as a re-
lation between an object, a sign and the 
interpretant (a sign created in the process 
of interpreting the triadic relation). This 
kind of semiotics is not based on struc-
tural signification but on the idea of mate-
rial objects as dynamic sources of mean-
ing. For Saussure, the signified was a psy-
chological object. Saussure’s semiology is 
therefore somewhat limited and may have 
worked for a science that treated mate-
rial culture as a structural text. The prag-
matic Peircean model, however, is more 
suitable for an archaeology that does not 
take human rationale as the sole founda-
tion for meaning. In his influential book, 
Archaeological Semiotics, Robert Preucel 
(2006, 247) wrote that “it is possible to 
show that archaeology is a pragmatic dis-
course constituted by meaning-making 
practices in the present that systemati-
cally articulate with the past meaning-
making practices.”
In addition to Robert Preucel, such au-
thors as Webmoor and Witmore (2008) 
have provided a take on social archae-
ology and thing-human relations that 
combines elements of continental phi-
losophy and pragmatism. Furthermore, 
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Timothy Webmoor (e.g. 2007) has writ-
ten extensively on pragmatism and ar-
chaeology. In his 2007 article he argues 
for a pragmatic (Jamesian) epistemology 
of archaeology in hope for a ‘mediating 
archaeology’. Thus Webmoor astutely 
identifies the possibilities of a pragmatic 
approach in rendering archaeology a 
unifying enterprise between the sciences 
and the humanities, as well as between 
archaeologists and non-archaeologists. 
Christopher Witmore (2012) provides an 
example of a somewhat pragmatist ap-
proach with his notion of pragmatology, 
the idea that things, events, and circum-
stances are real and have real effects on 
each other and as such provide the start-
ing point as well as the grounds for spec-
ulation for what possible course action 
could take, what could happen at any giv-
en instance, or what possible relevance 
a thing could have on another thing. He 
does not, however, explicitly refer to any 
particular pragmatist philosopher. In fact 
the notion of pragmatology was born out 
of the discussion revolving around sym-
metrical archaeology. Witmore’s prag-
matology nonetheless adopts the specu-
lative attitude that is vital for any realist 
archaeology. For a pragmatic approach 
to material agency, see Watts (2008). The 
above is by no means a complete listing 
of pragmatic approaches in archaeology, 
but a collection of some writings where 
a pragmatic approach has been adopt-
ed in regard to studying the nature of 
things after the so-called material turn in 
archaeology.
Structure of the new 
scientific archaeology
One of the key concepts used in this ar-
ticle is pragmatism, or pragmaticism as 
Peirce himself referred to the kind of 
pragmatism he advocated. Peirce wanted 
to distinguish his realist approach from 
the more constructivist and individually-
oriented pragmatism of his contemporar-
ies, namely William James, John Dewey, 
Josiah Royce, and F. C. S. Schiller:
“[My] word ‘pragmatism’ has gained 
general recognition in a generalized 
sense that seems to argue power of 
growth and vitality. The famed psychol-
ogist, James, first took it up, seeing that 
his ‘radical empiricism’ substantially 
answered to the writer’s definition of 
pragmatism, albeit with a certain differ-
ence in the point of view. Next, the ad-
mirably clear and brilliant thinker, Mr. 
Ferdinand C. S. Schiller, casting about 
for a more attractive name for the ‘an-
thropomorphism’ of his Riddle of the 
Sphinx, lit, in that most remarkable pa-
per of his on Axioms as Postulates, upon 
the same designation ‘pragmatism,’ 
which in its original sense was in ge-
neric agreement with his own doctrine, 
for which he has since found the more 
appropriate specification ‘humanism,’ 
while he still retains ‘pragmatism’ in a 
somewhat wider sense. So far all went 
happily. But at present, the word be-
gins to be met with occasionally in the 
literary journals, where it gets abused 
in the merciless way that words have 
to expect when they fall into literary 
clutches. Sometimes the manners of 
the British have effloresced in scolding 
at the word as ill-chosen – ill-chosen, 
that is, to express some meaning that it 
was rather designed to exclude. So then, 
the writer, finding his bantling ‘pragma-
tism’ so promoted, feels that it is time to 
kiss his child good-by and relinquish it 
to its higher destiny; while to serve the 
precise purpose of expressing the origi-
nal definition, he begs to announce the 
birth of the word ‘pragmaticism,’ which 
is ugly enough to be safe from kidnap-
pers.” (CP 5.414.)
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And:
“the word ‘pragmatism’ should hereaf-
ter be used somewhat loosely to signify 
affiliation with Schiller, James, Dewey, 
Royce, and the rest of us, while the par-
ticular doctrine which I invented the 
word to denote, which is your first kind 
of pragmatism, should be called ‘prag-
maticism.’ The extra syllable will indi-
cate the narrower meaning.” (CP 8.205.)
The word ‘pragmaticism’ is therefore a 
neologism that is used to refer to Peirce’s 
pragmatism particularly. When it comes 
to formulating a scientific archaeology 
according to the maxims of pragmatism, 
it is my view that a distinction between 
pragmatism and pragmaticism is a vi-
tal one and I have therefore adopted the 
term ‘pragmaticism’.3 Whereas both of the 
aforementioned parties take the impor-
tance of signs as paramount in forming 
all knowledge, a pragmatist would em-
phasise the role of an individual thinker 
in interpreting a sign. For a pragmatist 
the sign is more connected with the indi-
vidual mind. A pragmaticist, on the other 
hand, would stress the mind-independent 
nature of reality as a source of interpreta-
tion. For scientific archaeology, the reality 
of the past is of utmost importance. But 
the most important distinction, however, 
is to be made between pragmaticists and 
3  It is important to make the distinction be-
tween pragmatism and pragmaticism due to 
the many forms pragmatism has taken over the 
years of its existence. On the one hand, in ar-
chaeology, disregarding the term ‘pragmatism’ 
avoids the tedious distinction between theoret-
ical and pragmatic archaeology. On the other 
hand the difference relates to that between con-
structivism and realism. Constructivism tends 
to approach certain concepts as only culturally 
meaningful whereas pragmaticism emphasises 
concepts as historically meaningful habits of 
acting (see, e.g., Marila 2014).
rationalists. Pragmaticism is a method of 
thinking that presupposes the existence 
of a reality that would serve as a ‘com-
mon ground’ for experience, knowledge, 
and communication. I hope to have made 
clear by now what types of problems a ra-
tionalist archaeology has and what kind of 
trouble it would lead to.
Dunnell criticised archaeology for 
adopting a commonsensist attitude. It is 
therefore ironic that Peirce calls his prag-
maticism, including the scientific method, 
critical commonsensism. Even though 
Dunnell criticised archaeology for adopt-
ing a commonsensist attitude toward 
studying the past, his idea of science does 
not differ much from that of Peirce. Dun-
nell was after a coherent theory of archae-
ology that would be based on small hy-
potheses. Finding a coherent theory, how-
ever, may be impossible and even uncalled 
for. A more realistic approach would be to 
look for a coherent method for conducting 
scientific inquiry. Even more important 
than his semiotics is Peirce’s idea of the 
scientific method. In The Fixation of Belief, 
Peirce distinguishes between four methods 
of forming beliefs. All inquiry starts with 
the feeling of doubt and the object of all 
inquiry is the settlement of opinion (EP 1, 
114–115). Once science reaches its goal 
of settled opinions, all doubt disappears. 
Beliefs thus, at the end of the hypothetical 
day, become fixed. The object of all inquiry 
is the truth which in turn is based on reach-
ing true propositions (“if there be any such 
thing”, NEM 3, 773), about reality. The real 
in this sense becomes the object of truth. 
Once a group of scientists dedicated to a 
field of study reach a settled opinion (when 
doubt no longer arises), the truth has been 
reached. Or as Peirce himself more acutely 
puts it, “The opinion which is fated to be 
ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, 
is what we mean by the truth, and the ob-
ject represented in this opinion is the real” 
(CP 5.406–407).
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The fixation of belief (the search for 
truth) starts on the individual level. An 
individual’s fixed beliefs quickly become 
shaken by the realization of another per-
son’s opinions having the virtue of being 
equal to his (EP 1, 116–117). History has 
shown, however, that even the most tena-
cious (Peirce refers to this method as the 
method of ‘tenacity’, EP 1, 116) of indi-
viduals have ultimately had to alter their 
opinions once regarded as true. This is 
why a method of finding out the truth 
will not be based on individual research, 
but on that of a community (EP 1, 117). 
Such a method, the method of ‘authority’ 
(EP 1, 117), however, even though it has 
throughout the history been one of the 
most influential methods of upholding 
correct political doctrines for instance and 
led to great achievements, would ultimate-
ly lead to horrible atrocities. The method 
of authority will lead to a very slow change 
in beliefs and make the individual beliefs 
seem as fixed. It is a doctrine fit for masses 
(EP 1, 116–118).
A slow change rate would not, however, 
keep the most astute of individuals from 
figuring out that some men have, perhaps 
in a distant past, had ideas that differ very 
much from those of his. This will give rise 
to doubt in their mind. This method could 
be called the a priori method of reason 
(EP 1, 119). The a priori method, however, 
is nothing but a form of the authoritative 
method based on individual beliefs that 
have no real and mind-independent basis, 
just as the method of authority is based on 
ideas originating from within a commu-
nity of thinkers.
We hereby arrive at the fourth method 
that Peirce calls the scientific method (EP 
1, 121). The scientific method is based 
on the idea of a mind-independent real-
ity that similarly affects all individuals’ 
thinking. For any belief to be true, it must 
rest on some ‘external permanency’, some-
thing our thinking has no effect upon (EP 
1, 120). Again, Peirce (CP 5.384) puts it 
very eloquently:
“There are Real things, whose char-
acters are entirely independent of our 
opinions about them; those Reals affect 
our senses according to regular laws, 
and, though our sensations are as dif-
ferent as are our relations to the objects, 
yet, by taking advantage of the laws of 
perception, we can ascertain by reason-
ing how things really and truly are; and 
any man, if he have sufficient experi-
ence and he reason enough about it, will 
be led to the one True conclusion.”
And in referring to the mind-indepen-
dent universe as ‘common ground’ Peirce 
(CP 3.621) writes that:
“The universe must be well known 
and mutually known to be known and 
agreed to exist, in some sense, between 
speaker and hearer, between the mind 
as appealing to its own further consid-
eration and the mind as so appealed to, 
or there can be no communication, or 
‘common ground,’ at all. The universe is, 
thus, not a mere concept, but is the most 
real of experiences.”
Such are the methods of fixing beliefs. 
The scientific method, then, as the only of 
the four “which presents any distinction of 
a right and a wrong way” (EP 1, 121), is 
worth taking a closer look at. Before I go 
into this in any more detail, I have to point 
out one more thing. Peirce (CP 6.428) 
notes that the scientific method is not sci-
ence itself but an outcome of science: 
“That which constitutes science [...] is 
not so much correct conclusions, as it 
is a correct method. But the method of 
science is itself a scientific result. It did 
not spring out of the brain of a begin-
ner: it was a historic attainment and a 
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scientific achievement. So that not even 
this method ought to be regarded as 
essential to the beginnings of science. 
That which is essential, however, is the 
scientific spirit, which is determined 
not to rest satisfied with existing opin-
ions, but to press on to the real truth of 
nature.”
According to Peirce, “all human knowl-
edge, up to the highest flights of science, is 
but the development of our inborn animal 
instincts” (CP 2.754). Because the pro-
cesses of thought and nature are alike (CP 
3.422), “the human mind is akin to the 
truth” (CP 7.220). The role of instinct and 
guessing has not often been taken serious-
ly in science. This hypothesis, however, 
seems very natural once we abandon the 
false idea of man being somehow inde-
pendent of nature and its laws. Like Peirce 
stated above, what constitutes science is 
not the correct conclusions it may ulti-
mately arrive at but a correct method. On 
occasion, however, Peirce (e.g. CP 1.43–
45) refers to pragmaticism as an attitude, 
not as a method. It is therefore custom-
ary to see pragmaticism, as formulated by 
Peirce, not as a scientific method but as a 
scientific attitude even today.
It is now perhaps time to present the 
basic tenets of a scientific archaeology ac-
cording to this scientific attitude. These 
key concepts are what I think constitute 
a scientific approach most suitable for a 
realist approach to archaeology. These 
themes have been to some extent dis-
cussed above but I will now support them 
by citing Peirce’s exact words more.
1. Fallibilism and meliorism
“All positive reasoning is of the nature 
of judging the proportion of something 
in a whole collection by the proportion 
found in a sample. Accordingly, there 
are three things to which we can never 
hope to attain by reasoning, namely, 
absolute certainty, absolute exactitude, 
absolute universality. We cannot be ab-
solutely certain that our conclusions are 
even approximately true; for the sample 
may be utterly unlike the unsampled 
part of the collection. We cannot pre-
tend to be even probably exact; because 
the sample consists of but a finite num-
ber of instances and only admits special 
values of the proportion sought.” (CP 
1.141.)
By positive reasoning, Peirce refers to 
the idea that our knowledge has a positive 
relationship with what is real. Again, I re-
fer to Peirce’s idea of a common ground 
that makes all scientific inquiry and com-
munication relevant. Regardless of the as-
sumption that philosophy and archaeol-
ogy are positive sciences, we as scientists 
must “not block the way of inquiry” (CP 
1.135) by tenaciously clinging to strands 
of knowledge we may regard as true. Nor 
is it reasonable to expect all knowledge to 
be false. That would lead to rationalism 
and skepticism which are unintelligible 
outlooks. It is just beneficial not to build 
knowledge upon a priori facts (although 
scientists should avoid dogmatism) but by 
the same token it would be foolish to cat-
egorically doubt all of our senses. People 
do err, but, since, according to what has 
been discussed above about our ability to 
guess correctly (and learn), we are prob-
ably right more often than not.4
4  It is worth noticing that Peirce’s idea of fal-
libilism predates Karl Popper’s works on falsi-
ficationism, which I will leave out of this paper 
for economical reasons. It is clear that Popper 
did study Peirce’s philosophy and shared for 
example Peirce’s ideas about indeterminacy 
and chance (Popper 1979, 215). In his essay 
Of Clouds and Clocks, Popper (1979, 212–213) 
speaks highly of Peirce, calling him one of the 
greatest philosophers of all time.
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“[F]allibilism is the doctrine that our 
knowledge is never absolute but always 
swims, as it were, in a continuum of un-
certainty and of indeterminacy. Now 
the doctrine of continuity is that all 
things so swim in continua.” (CP 1.171.) 
“Evolution means nothing but growth 
in the widest sense of that word. 
Reproduction, of course, is merely one 
of the incidents of growth. And what 
is growth? Not mere increase. [...] But 
think what an astonishing idea this of 
diversification is! Is there such thing 
in nature as increase of variety? Were 
things simpler, was variety less in the 
original nebula from which the solar 
system is supposed to have grown than 
it is now when the land and sea swarms 
with animal and vegetable forms with 
their intricate anatomies and still more 
wonderful economies? It would seem 
as if there were an increase in variety, 
would it not?” (CP 1.174.)
“Once you have embraced the principle 
of continuity no kind of explanation of 
things will satisfy you except that they 
grew. The infallibilist naturally thinks 
that everything always was substantially 
as it is now. Laws at any rate being abso-
lute could not grow. They either always 
were, or they sprang instantaneously 
into being by a sudden fiat like the drill 
of a company of soldiers. This makes the 
laws of nature absolutely blind and inex-
plicable. Their why and wherefore can’t 
be asked. This absolutely blocks the 
road of inquiry. The fallibilist won’t do 
this. He asks may these forces of nature 
not be somehow amenable to reason? 
May they not have naturally grown up? 
After all, there is no reason to think they 
are absolute. If all things are continu-
ous, the universe must be undergoing a 
continuous growth from non-existence 
to existence. There is no difficulty in 
conceiving existence as a matter of de-
gree. The reality of things consists in 
their persistent forcing themselves upon 
our recognition. If a thing has no such 
persistence, it is a mere dream. Reality, 
then, is persistence, is regularity. In the 
original chaos, where there was no regu-
larity, there was no existence. It was all a 
confused dream. This we may suppose 
was in the infinitely distant past. But as 
things are getting more regular, more 
persistent, they are getting less dreamy 
and more real.” (CP 1.175.)
Because of their ability to form positive 
knowledge, people are able to evolve and 
gain more knowledge, in a sense get bet-
ter at doing things. This is an important 
argument also for the ability of scientific 
archaeology to know more about the past 
than the alternative approaches to study-
ing the past. Success, however, is only pos-
sible if we work to achieve it. Such outlook 
has been referred to as ‘meliorism’. It can 
be described as an idea about the world 
that does not take it as the best nor the 
worst possible, but that it certainly is ca-
pable of improvement. Although Peirce 
does not use the term ‘meliorism’ often, it 
can be linked to his ideas about ethics; the 
question of what end is possible. Science 
therefore should be ethical in its attempt 
to work toward the most ‘admirable end’:
“Ethics, or the science of right and 
wrong, must appeal to Esthetics for aid 
in determining the summum bonum. It 
is the theory of self-controlled, or delib-
erate, conduct.” (CP 1.191.)
2. The structure of scientific inquiry
The following ideas have also been ex-
plicated to some degree above but they 
deserve more attention. The structure of 
scientific inquiry follows the basic rules of 
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scientific attitude, for example that sham 
reasoning is to be avoided (CP 1.57), as 
presented above. Some ideas, however, are 
very important. These include the pro-
cesses of inference, for example.
In addition to the traditional forms 
of inference (induction and deduction), 
Peirce formulated a third kind of infer-
ence, one he called abduction. Abductive 
reasoning is the basis for all processes of 
forming archaeological knowledge and it 
is often connected to cases where a sur-
prising fact requires an explanation (EP 
2, 287). In archaeology, abduction can 
often be characterised as inference to the 
best explanation, i.e. what explanation 
serves as the best one for a given set of 
observed facts. The relevance of abductive 
reasoning in crime scene investigation or 
Sherlock Holmes-type detective work has 
often been stressed in philosophical texts 
(e.g. Eco & Sebeok 1983). Abductive infer-
ence is therefore very important also in ar-
chaeology which has been said to resemble 
the aforementioned sciences very closely 
(e.g. Klejn 2001, 31, 38–41, 128). The role 
of abductive reasoning in archaeology has 
nevertheless been studied very little. Some 
of the rare exceptions include Leo Klejn’s 
(2001, 128) view of the abductive nature 
of archaeological knowledge, Cameron 
Shelley’s writings about visual abduction 
in archaeology (e.g. Shelley 1996), and 
some rare references to abduction as infer-
ence to the best explanation that were car-
ried out as part of the processual discourse 
(Hanen & Kelley 1995 (1989)).5
All science is, or should ultimately be, 
based on similar processes of reasoning. 
According to the later writings of Charles 
Peirce, abduction, a weak mode of infer-
ence, can be characterised as a guess-
ing instinct for finding good hypotheses 
similar to that of the animals’ instinct for 
5  For a more recent take on abduction in ar-
chaeology, see Marila 2013.
doing things that are beneficial or neces-
sary for their survival that has developed 
during hundreds of thousands of years 
of evolution (Paavola 2005, 131–132). To 
back this up, Peirce argues that it would 
have been virtually impossible for hu-
mans to have developed and reached the 
current state of knowledge if reasoning 
was based on mere guessing. In this sense 
the human mind is, as I already stated 
above, “akin to the truth” (CP 7.220). 
Abduction is the first phase of inquiry 
with which ideas and hypotheses are gen-
erated. Induction (together with abduc-
tion, of course, and to some degree also 
deduction) are then used to test new ideas 
and hypotheses (CP 6.526–536). When 
the basis of knowledge is understood in 
this fashion, there is little room for argu-
ing in favour of a theory of semantic logic 
as the grounds and boundaries of knowl-
edge as has been the case traditionally in 
processual archaeology with its fixation 
with covering law models and the hypo-
thetic-deductive model.
According to Peirce’s own words, 
abduction
“consists in examining a mass of facts 
and in allowing these facts to suggest a 
theory. In this way we gain new ideas; 
but there is no force in the reasoning. 
[...] [I]nduction is, as Aristotle says, 
the inference of the truth of the major 
premiss of a syllogism of which the mi-
nor premiss is made to be true and the 
conclusion is found to be true, while 
abduction is the inference of the truth 
of the minor premiss of a syllogism of 
which the major premiss is selected as 
known already to be true while the con-
clusion is found to be true. Abduction 
furnishes all our ideas concerning real 
things, beyond what are given in per-
ception, but is mere conjecture, without 
probative force.” (CP 8.209.)
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“Abduction is the process of forming an 
explanatory hypothesis. It is the only 
logical operation which introduces any 
new idea; for induction does nothing 
but determine a value, and deduction 
merely evolves the necessary conse-
quences of a pure hypothesis.
Deduction proves that something must 
be; Induction shows that something 
actually is operative; Abduction merely 
suggests that something may be.
Its only justification is that from its sug-
gestion deduction can draw a predic-
tion which can be tested by induction, 
and that, if we are ever to learn anything 
or to understand phenomena at all, it 
must be by abduction that this is to be 
brought about.
No reason whatsoever can be given for 
it, as far as I can discover; and it needs 
no reason, since it merely offers sugges-
tions.” (CP 5.171.)
Such is the case with much of archaeo-
logical knowledge which is often based 
on very fragmentary, although massive, 
evidence of past action. Archaeological 
hypotheses, or sometimes more like 
guesses, something Peirce (CP 6.526) calls 
‘abductory inductions’, that are formed on 
the basis of that fragmentary record can 
then be tested with induction (testing of 
hypotheses by means of prediction), i.e. 
whether future occurrences of similar 
facts in the archaeological record fit in the 
picture. In effect, integrating abduction in 
the process of archaeological inquiry as 
the third (or fundamental) and explana-
tory element of inference renders archae-
ology an explanatory science rather than a 
descriptive activity.6
6  See Bradley 2009 for a take on pragmaticism 
as an explanatorist enterprise.
3. The final opinion and the long run
The accumulation of knowledge is based 
on an understanding of interpretation 
as a mediative sign creation process. 
Peirce’s view of sign is based on a tripar-
tite structure of relations between three 
sign components. A sign is composed of 
the sign-vehicle (or representamen), ob-
ject, and the interpretant.7 All genuine 
signs are composed of these three insepa-
rable parts. The process of interpreting 
a sign will create another sign which in 
turn becomes interpreted, thus creating 
another sign in the process. This chain of 
sign creation Peirce called semiosis (EP 2, 
411). The accumulation of knowledge can 
be widely understood as semiosis or sign 
activity and would continue as long as any 
sign becomes interpreted. It is therefore 
important to understand that interpreta-
tion (and all archaeological inquiry) is a 
diachronic process that ultimately tran-
scends the individual. Here is what Peirce 
writes about the sign and the process of 
interpretation:
“A Sign is a Cognizable that, on the one 
hand, is so determined (i.e., specialized, 
bestimmt) by something other than it-
self, called its Object [...], while, on the 
other hand, it so determines some actu-
al or potential Mind, the determination 
whereof I term the Interpretant created 
by the Sign, that that Interpreting Mind 
is therein determined mediately by the 
Object.” (EP 2, 492.)
“A sign, or representamen, is something 
which stands to somebody for some-
thing in some respect or capacity. It ad-
dresses somebody, that is, creates in the 
mind of that person an equivalent sign, 
or perhaps a more developed sign. That 
7  See Preucel 2006 for a concise summary of 
Peircean semiotics in archaeology.
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sign which it creates I call the interpre-
tant of the first sign. The sign stands 
for something, its object. It stands for 
that object, not in all respects, but in 
reference to a sort of idea, which I have 
sometimes called the ground of the rep-
resentamen. ‘Idea’ is here to be under-
stood in a sort of Platonic sense, very fa-
miliar in everyday talk [...].” (CP 2.228.)
“suppose I awake in the morning before 
my wife, and that afterwards she wakes 
up and inquires, ‘What sort of a day is 
it?’ This is a sign, whose Object, as ex-
pressed, is the weather at that time, but 
whose Dynamical Object is the impres-
sion which I have presumably derived 
from peeping between the window-cur-
tains. Whose Interpretant, as expressed, 
is the quality of the weather, but whose 
Dynamical Interpretant, is my answer-
ing her question. But beyond that, there 
is a third Interpretant. The Immediate 
Interpretant is what the Question ex-
presses, all that it immediately expresses, 
which I have imperfectly restated above. 
The Dynamical Interpretant is the actual 
effect that it has upon me, its interpreter. 
But the Significance of it, the Ultimate, 
or Final, Interpretant is her purpose 
in asking it, what effect its answer will 
have as to her plans for the ensuing day. 
I reply, let us suppose: ‘It is a stormy 
day.’ Here is another sign. Its Immediate 
Object is the notion of the present 
weather so far as this is common to her 
mind and mine – not the character of 
it, but the identity of it. The Dynamical 
Object is the identity of the actual or 
Real meteorological conditions at the 
moment. The Immediate Interpretant is 
the schema in her imagination, i.e. the 
vague Image or what there is in com-
mon to the different Images of a stormy 
day. The Dynamical Interpretant is the 
disappointment or whatever actual ef-
fect it at once has upon her. The Final 
Interpretant is the sum of the Lessons of 
the reply, Moral, Scientific, etc. Now it 
is easy to see that my attempt to draw 
this three-way, ‘trivialis’ distinction, re-
lates to a real and important three-way 
distinction, and yet that it is quite hazy 
and needs a vast deal of study before it is 
rendered perfect.” (CP 8.314.)
“We must also note that there is certain-
ly a third kind of Interpretant, which I 
call the Final Interpretant, because it 
is that which would finally be decided 
to be the true interpretation if consid-
eration of the matter were carried so far 
that an ultimate opinion were reached.” 
(EP 2, 496.)
Since there is a real world around us, 
we can, as a scientific community, reach 
agreement as to its nature. As I have al-
ready stated above, the object of scientific 
inquiry is the truth. It is worthy of more 
attention what Peirce has to say about it:
“I call ‘truth’ the predestinate opinion, 
by which I ought to have meant that 
which would ultimately prevail if inves-
tigation were carried sufficiently far in 
that particular direction.” (EP 2, 457.)
“Truth is a character which attaches to 
an abstract proposition, such as a per-
son might utter.” (CP 5.565–566.)
“To say that a proposition is true is to 
say that every interpretation of it is 
true.” (CP 5.569.)
The propositional truth8, then, as more 
or less synonymous to the final opinion, 
8  It should be noted that with the pragmaticis-
tic notion of truth as something that would be 
arrived at if inquiry were pursued indefinitely, 
we are reintroducing the idea of truth in phi-
losophy of science also on a more common 
212
Interarchaeologia, 4
should be distinguished from reality as 
real, which, again, is the object of truth:
“That which is such that something true 
about it is either true independently 
of the thought of any definite mind or 
minds or is at least true independently 
of what any person or any definite indi-
vidual group of persons think about that 
truth, is real.” (SS 117.)
If scientific inquiry (a conduct ac-
cording to the tenets of a scientific at-
titude) were pursued long enough, the 
truth would be reached. Such an opinion 
would be the final one; it would lead to 
the disappearance of a desire caused by 
the need to find out the truth. All doubt, 
and ultimately all movement of the mind, 
would cease. One of the malaises of (post)
modern science is the tendency to reduce 
truth to the individual level. A solipsist 
easily arrives at the assumption that her 
knowledge is the only interpretation of 
reality. This idea has led to a more or less 
general acceptance of the post-processual 
proverb that the past cannot be reached 
and known to any degree of certainty. 
The idea of truth as something that can 
be reached in the long run should not 
level. For Kuhn (1964), for example, the idea 
of truth was not that important. This has been 
the case also in post-processual archaeology 
in general, where, instead of searching for the 
past as it once happened, many archaeolo-
gists were more interested in reconstructing 
the past according to the multitude of inter-
pretations of it. Today, the idea of truth is also 
evident in current continental philosophy and 
metaphysics for example in the works of Alain 
Badiou (2003), for whom truth can be reached 
by adopting a mathematical methodology. 
Mathematics for Badiou has to replace the 
structuralist or analytical notion of philosophy 
as language. In fact mathematics, according to 
Badiou (2003, 183) as the only rational way of 
dealing with infinity, has to replace metaphys-
ics as it is known today in general.
be taken as a confirmation of an inevi-
table arrival at true propositions but as 
the p o s s i b i l i t y  to find answers to 
questions. For if it were not for our faith 
in finding out the truth, why should we 
ever doubt anything in the first place? 
The conduct of any scientific inquiry is, 
however, painfully slow and hard. We 
may never know for example what a par-
ticular material object may have meant to 
past people (some information will prob-
ably inevitably remain ‘buried secrets’), 
but we must keep doing our best to do 
so. Matthew Johnson (1999, 114) puts 
it well: “[A]rchaeology is very difficult.” 
Archaeologists must therefore be patient. 
Forming archaeological knowledge takes 
a long time, longer than that of an indi-
vidual thinker’s lifespan.
Synthesis
In this article, I have suggested that ar-
chaeologists, in place of methodological 
rigorism, adopt a scientific ‘attitude’. Three 
main tenets inspired by pragmaticist phi-
losophy of science remain at the heart of 
such scientific archaeology:
1. Archaeologists, like all scientists, are 
fallible and often wrong. Our inter-
pretations and explanations regarding 
the archaeological material record are 
unlikely absolutely correct, but at least, 
more often than not.
2. Our hypotheses seem to be the best 
explanations, given that we are well ac-
quainted with the material and follow 
some basic guidelines of ethical scien-
tific conduct.
3. As there is a line of reasoning running 
throughout all of the history of archae-
ology, it would appear that archae-
ologists really do get better at forming 
hypotheses. This in turn would sug-
gest that knowledge is accumulative. 
But then again, archaeologists, like all 
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scientist, are fallible. This takes us back 
to number one on my list.
In this article, I am not suggesting the 
emergence of a new scientific paradigm. 
Because I do not believe there has ever 
been a true paradigmatic shift in archae-
ology in the Kuhnian (1964) sense, the 
new pragmaticistic archaeology should be 
understood as a synthesis between proces-
sual archaeology and post-processual ar-
chaeology – a new scientific attitude and 
the new possibility of a scientific archaeol-
ogy. I may even be suggesting something 
that has always been taken for granted, or 
been obvious, in archaeology, but I hope 
to have shifted the focus to a ‘common 
ground’ between all approaches in the 
history of scientific archaeology. In retro-
spect it can be noted about archaeology in 
general that it has always admirably used 
different approaches and methods from 
different sciences. They have not always 
been the most pertinent and often even 
outdated (Bintliff 1991, 2). According to 
Preucel and Mrozowski (2010, 33), who 
also strive for a pragmatistic archaeology, 
studying the past is based on a science 
that is diverse in methods, as well as epis-
temology. When it comes to theories and 
methodology, the disunity of science need 
be seen as its strength, not as its weak-
ness. Pragmaticistic archaeology will seek 
answers to the same questions that have 
always been the moving force in the con-
duct of all archaeological inquiry. Its ap-
proach may just differ from some of the 
preceding discourses, particularly from 
those most liberal and multivocal in their 
philosophies.
Pragmaticistic archaeology is a combi-
nation of certain methods from the sys-
tematic natural sciences as well as human-
ities, mainly Peircean semiotics (Preucel & 
Mrozowski 2010, 32). It is courage to pro-
pose small questions, and courage to occa-
sionally err and still have faith in science. 
It is motivated by the melioristic idea of 
the accumulation of knowledge, however 
painfully slow it may seem. This is to im-
ply that pragmaticism is a work in process. 
It is an attitude, not a scientific method. 
In addition to the two cultures, natural 
science and humanities, as proposed by 
Snow, semiotics as a whole can be seen as 
a third culture that seeks to bridge the gap 
between the two discourses. In fact, a se-
miotician would not make that distinction 
in the first place. Pragmaticism is the kind 
of philosophy that all science should start 
from. One of the reasons the two cultures 
emerged in the first place is that for hun-
dreds of years philosophy was based on 
a rationalist approach that only took any 
rational (mind-dependent) proposition as 
relevant. The empirical world did not mat-
ter. Semiotics, as described by Peirce, is 
based on the idea of a mind-independent 
real world. A philosophy that denies the 
importance of experience and perception 
is a philosophy that does not deal with the 
real and knowable world. A pragmaticistic 
semiotics, however, is an e m p i r i c a l l y 
s e n s i t i v e  philosophy. One reason is 
probably the fact that many of the first 
real pragmatists were scientists. William 
James was a physician and a psychologist, 
Peirce was a chemist and a geodesist. By 
the same token, if a philosopher should 
not disregard the achievements of other 
sciences, nor should any scientist remain 
unaware of the advances in philosophy. 
The research problems of two seemingly 
different sciences often seem to be divided 
by such a vast territory that it makes them 
seem unrelated. A closer inspection and a 
mature investigation usually proves that 
this is not the case:
“In the Roman schools, grammar, logic, 
and rhetoric were felt to be akin and to 
make up a rounded whole called the 
trivium. This feeling was just; for the 
three essential branches of semeiotics, 
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of which the first, called speculative 
grammar by Duns Scotus, studies the 
ways in which an object can be a sign; 
the second, the leading part of logic, 
best termed speculative critic, studies 
the ways in which a sign can be related 
to the object independent of it that it 
represents; while the third is the specu-
lative rhetoric.” (EP 2, 326–327.)
“The point of view just explained enables 
us to perceive that a particular branch of 
science, such as Physical Chemistry or 
Mediterranean Archeology, is no mere 
word, manufactured by the arbitrary 
definition of some academic pedant, but 
is a real object, being the very concrete 
life of a social group constituted by real 
facts of inter-relation, – as real an object 
as a human carcase, which is made one 
by the inter-relations of its millions of 
cells.” (CP 7.52.)
Mark Pearce (2011) has pointed out 
that archaeology is not heading toward 
another paradigmatic shift, but archae-
ologists are realising that good science 
is flexible and does not let theoretical 
standpoints to hinder its advancement. 
That is why theory, according to Pearce 
(2011, 87) in archaeology has become 
bricolage, a more pragmatic and more 
open archaeology that mixes methods ac-
cording to the research question at hand. 
Pearce is correct in stating this, but he 
does not take into account some of the 
profound philosophical presuppositions 
between certain archaeological para-
digms. In fact, he states that theoretical 
positions are not necessarily as different 
as they may appear. What Pearce fails to 
notice, however, is that a relativist or a 
structuralist archaeology and a positiv-
ist, naturalistically oriented archaeol-
ogy for instance rest on totally different, 
and incompatible, philosophies. A post-
structuralist archaeologist may base his 
archaeology on the idea of meaning as 
something internal to the mind, whereas 
a naturalist or a pragmaticist archaeolo-
gist has to necessarily take meaning as 
something that is not restricted to the 
mere rational operations of an individual 
mind but is the result of sensible interac-
tion between objects. Pearce is therefore 
not correct in his statement that archae-
ologists could adopt a pragmatic (not a 
reference to philosophical pragmatism) 
attitude toward studying the past from 
any theoretical vantage point they see as 
the most suitable, regardless of the level 
of interpretation. There are some pro-
found philosophical issues that have to 
be taken into account when doing sci-
ence. Not all methods are equal in this 
sense, and archaeology may not be able 
to adopt the eclectic attitude that Pearce 
suggests. A basic scientific philosophi-
cal attitude, however, has to be taken as a 
starting point for doing scientific archae-
ology. As an attitude of doing science, 
pragmaticism aims at overcoming the 
divisions that have been made in archae-
ology in regard to theory and method-
ology. Pragmaticism is therefore a third 
culture (in addition, or rather replacing 
the two identified by Snow) that aims at 
unifying science and the humanities by 
realising that there are certain processes 
of knowledge formation that are common 
to all sciences, and all inquiry in general, 
regardless of the applied methodology.
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